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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys recent developments in the state statutory and
common law that affect labor and employment relations of Georgia
employers. Accordingly, it surveys published decisions interpreting
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Georgia law from June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009.1 This Article also
includes highlights of 2certain revisions to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.).
II.

A.

RECENT LEGISLATION

Modification of Covenants Not to Compete

On April 29, 2009, Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue signed into law
House Bill 173,' which amends existing law regarding employment
contracts that restrict competition,4 but this legislation will not become
effective unless Georgia passes an amendment to the Georgia Constitution.5 House Bill 173, if it becomes effective, would allow a court to
modify and limit the relief of otherwise unenforceable covenants rather
than invalidate them entirely.' It would also provide specific guidelines

1. For analysis of Georgia labor and employment law during the prior survey period,
see W. Melvin Haas III, et al. Laborand Employment Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
60 MERCER L. REv. 217 (2008).
2. Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference
sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See generally THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006); BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (C. Geoffrey Weirich

et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007); W. Christopher Arbery et al., Labor and Employment, Eleventh
CircuitSurvey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1281 (2009); Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA). Accordingly, this
Article is not intended to cover the latest developments in federal labor and employment
law. Rather, this Article is intended only to cover legislative and judicial developments
arising under Georgia state law during the survey period.
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 173, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 231 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-2, -50
to -59 (1982 & Supp. 2009)).
4. See id., 2009 Ga. Laws at 231 ("AN ACT To amend Chapter 8 of Title 13 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, . . . to provide for the enforcement of contracts that
restrict or prohibit competition in certain commercial agreements; to provide for the
judicial enforcement of such provisions; to provide for the modification of such provisions
5. Id. § 4, 2009 Ga. Laws at 246 ("This Act shall become effective on the day following
the ratification at the time of the 2010 general election of an amendment to the
Constitution of Georgia providing for the enforcement of covenants in commercial contracts
that limit competition and shall apply to contracts entered into on and after such date and
shall not apply in actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered
into before such date. If such amendment is not so ratified, then this Act shall stand
automatically repealed.").
6. Id. § 3, 2009 Ga. Laws at 243 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54 (Supp. 2009)) ("[11f a
court finds that a contractually specified restraint does not comply with [certain
provisions], then the court may modify the restraint provision and grant only the relief
reasonably necessary to protect [legitimate business interests established by the person
seeking enforcement] and to achieve the original intent of the contracting parties to the
extent possible.").
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for determining such covenants' enforceability.7 Georgia law already
recognizes covenants not to compete in employment contracts, but under
current law, if any covenant in a given contract is unreasonable, then all

remaining covenants in the same contract are unenforceable.'
In 1991 the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated a statute that allowed

judicial modification of covenants not to compete9 on the ground that
the statute defeated or lessened competition or encouraged monopolies
in violation of the Georgia Constitution. 0 To prevent House Bill 173
from encountering similar constitutional problems, Georgia must hold a
referendum in 2010 to amend its constitution to provide for the
enforcement of covenants in commercial contracts that limit competition. 1 If Georgia ratifies this constitutional amendment, then House
Bill 173 will become effective the following day; otherwise, House Bill
173 will be automatically repealed.12

7. See id., 2009 Ga. Laws at 242-43, 244-46 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-53, -55 to 58 (Supp. 2009)).
8. Ward v. Process Control Corp., 247 Ga. 583,584,277 S.E.2d 671,673 (1981) ("If any
covenant not to compete within a given employment contract is unreasonable either in
time, territory, or prohibited business activity, then all covenants not to compete within
the same employment contract are unenforceable.").
9. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2. 1(gXl) (Supp. 2009), invalidatedby Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Hart,
261 Ga. 371, 371, 405 S.E.2d 253, 254 (1991), and repealedby Ga. H.R. Bill 173, § 2, 2009
Ga. Laws at 232-37. The statute provided as follows:
Every court of competent jurisdiction shall enforce through any appropriate
remedy every contract in partial restraint of trade that is not against the policy
of the law or otherwise unlawful. In the absence of extreme hardship on the part
of the person or entity bound by such restraint, injunctive relief shall be presumed
to be an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of the contracts described in
subsections (b) through (d) of this Code section. If any portion of such restraint
is against the policy of the law in any respect but such restraint, considered as a
whole, is not so clearly unreasonable and overreaching in its terms as to be
unconscionable, the court shall enforce so much of such restraint as it determines
by a preponderance of the evidence to be necessary to protect the interests of the
parties that benefit from such restraint. Such a restraint shall be subject to
partial enforcement, whether or not it contains a severability or similar clause and
regardless of whether the unlawful aspects of such restraint are facially severable
from those found lawful.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1(g)(1).
10. Jackson & Coker, 261 Ga. at 371-72, 405 S.E.2d at 254 (citing GA. CONST. art. III,
§ 6, para. 5(c) ("The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract
or agreement which may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect of
defeating or lessening competition, or encouraging a monopoly. ..
11. See Ga. H.R. Bill 173, § 4, 2009 Ga. Laws at 246.
12. Id.
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WRONGFUL TERMINATION

Overview

At-will employment refers to employment that either an employer or
an employee may terminate at any time without cause.1" Though the
employment-at-will doctrine is weakening in many jurisdictions,14
Georgia law presumes that all employment is at-will unless there is a
contractual or a statutory exception.1" In particular, O.C.G.A. § 34-7116 provides that an "indefinite hiring" is at-will employment."
Indefinite hiring includes "permanent employment," "employment for
life," and "employment until retirement."" Reference to an annual
salary does not specify a definite period of employment."9 If an
employment contract specifies a definite period of employment,
any
20
employment beyond that definite period is employment at-will.
2
Generally, the discharge of at-will employees is not actionable 1
regardless of the employer's motives or reasons.22 An employer's oral

13.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (8th ed. 2004).

14. W. Melvin Haas III, et al., Labor andEmployment Law, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 217, 219 (2008) ("[The employment-at-will doctrine is gradually
eroding in other jurisdictions.") (citing Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to
Employment at Will-When Should Courts Defer to the Legislature?,72 NEB. L. REV. 956
(1993); Melanie Robin Galberry, Note, Employers Beware: South Carolina'sPublic Policy
Exception to the At-Will Employment DoctrineIs Likely to Keep Expanding,51 S.C. L. REV.
406 (2000); Kimberly Anne Huffman, Note, Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc.: Clarifyingthe
Confusion in North Carolina'sEmployment-at-Will Doctrine, 70 N.C. L. REV. 2087 (1992);
Cortlan H. Maddux, Comment, Employers Beware! The Emerging Use of Promissory
Estoppel as an Exception to Employment at Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 197 (1997); Richard
J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modifwation of Employment Handbooks: Further
Encroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1990)).
15. E.g., Zimmerman v. Cherokee County, 925 F. Supp. 777,781 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing
O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2008)).
16. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1.
17. Id.
18. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612,613, 250 S.E.2d 442,443-44 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
19. See Gatins v. NCR Corp., 180 Ga. App. 595, 597, 349 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1986).
20. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 148-49, 534
S.E.2d 533, 535 (2000).
21. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228, 599 S.E.2d 158, 160-61 (2004).
22. See Mr. B's Oil Co. v. Register, 181 Ga. App. 166, 167, 351 S.E.2d 533, 534 (1986)
("[When] the plaintiffs employment is terminable at will, the employer, with or without
cause and regardless of the motives involved, can discharge the employee without incurring
liability. Lengthy allegations regarding the motives or reasons for the firing are legally
irrelevant.").
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promise not to discharge or treat adversely an at-will employee does not
modify the at-will relationship between employer and employee because
oral promises are generally not enforceable by at-will employees. 23
When there is no written contract of employment, there is no cause of
action against the employer for alleged wrongful termination.2' When
there is an at-will-employment contract, the terms of the employment
contract are generally unenforceable.2
During the survey period, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held in Soloski v. Adams 21 that under
Georgia's at-will-employment doctrine, an employer's oral promise not
to find an at-will employee in violation of a sexual harassment policy in
exchange for that employee's resignation is unenforceable. 7 In Soloski
a female University of Georgia employee alleged that the plaintiff, the
dean of the University's Grady College of Journalism, sexually harassed
her verbally. The plaintiff did not deny making the comments but
denied that they constituted sexual harassment.'
The plaintiff
claimed that during an investigation by the University's Office of Legal
Affairs (OLA), he and the provost agreed orally that if the plaintiff
resigned, the University would not find him in violation of the sexual
harassment policy, and the OLA would only write positive things about
him. The plaintiff resigned, and two days later the OLA officially found
that the plaintiff had violated the sexual harassment policy. 9 Among
other things, the plaintiff claimed that the provost and others committed
fraud by making a promise not to find him in violation of the sexual
harassment policy in exchange for his resignation without the intention
of ever following through with that promise.3 ° Under Georgia law,
"'fraud can be predicated on a misrepresentation [about] a future event
where the defendant knows [such] event will not take place, [but] fraud
cannot be predicated on a promise which is unenforceable at the time it
is made.' 3 1

23. See Balmer, 278 Ga. at 228-29, 599 S.E.2d at 161.
24. Id.; see Jacobs v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 172 Ga. App. 319, 320, 323 S.E.2d 238, 239
(1984).

25.

See Rodriguez v. Vision Corr. Group, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 478, 479, 580 S.E.2d 266,

268 (2003).
26. 600 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

27. Id. at 1320.
28. Id. at 1290-91.
29. Id. at 1294-95.

30. Id. at 1317.
31. Id. at 1320 (quoting Studdard v. George D. Warthen Bank, 207 Ga. App. 80,81,427
S.E.2d 58, 59 (1993)).
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Among the issues before the court was whether the provost's promise,
if actually made,32 would have been enforceable at the time it was
made.33 The court held that "oral promises by employers are not
enforceable by at-will employees."' Because the plaintiff's employment
contract specifically provided that he held his "administrative title and
position at the pleasure of the President," his employment was at-will
under Georgia law.' Because the provost could have "terminate[d the]
plaintiff's employment as dean for any reason at any time, any terms of
the agreement reached between [the] plaintiff and [the] defendants not
reduced to writing were unenforceable at the time they were made."36
Therefore, the charge of fraud could not be supported by the alleged oral
promise.37
B.

Exceptions to At-Will Employment
The statute creating the employment-at-will doctrine contains a
significant exception: the parties may contract otherwise.' During the
survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Avion Systems, Inc. v.
Thompson 39 held that an employee's covenant to work for at least
twelve months was enforceable, even though the employment was
generally at-will.40 In Avion the employer claimed that its former
employee violated a provision in the employment contract by terminating
her employment before the required term of one year. The introductory
paragraph of the contract provided that the employee was a "full time
employee at will," but the body of the contract provided that the
employee agreed to provide services "for a minimum of twelve (12)
months."4
Among the issues before the court was whether the
agreement to provide services for twelve months was invalid because it
conflicted with the general provision for employment at-will. 42 The

32. Id. at 1317 (noting that the provost denied ever making such a promise).
33. See id. at 1319.
34. Id. at 1320.
35. Id. at 1319-20.
36. Id. at 1320.
37. Id.
38. See O.C.GA. § 34-7-1.
39. 293 Ga. App. 60, 666 S.E.2d 464 (2008). This is a later procedural instance of Avion
Systems, Inc. v. Thompson, 286 Ga. App. 847, 650 S.E.2d 349 (2007), rev'd, 284 Ga. 15, 663
S.E.2d 236 (2008), discussed in W. Melvin Haas III, et al., Labor and Employment Law,
Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER L. REV. 217, 221-22 (2008).
40. 293 Ga. App. at 60-61, 666 S.E.2d at 465-66.
41. Id. at 61, 666 S.E.2d at 466 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 62, 666 S.E.2d at 467.
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court of appeals held the agreement was valid.4 3 Relying on the
general rule of contract construction that "'when a [contractual]
provision specifically addresses the issue in question, it prevails over any
conflicting general language,'" the court reasoned that the specific
provision for a minimum of twelve months' service prevailed over the
conflicting general at-will language."
The court reasoned that this
result effectuated the intent of the parties, upheld the whole contract
and each of its parts, and was consistent with common practice.4
C. Continued Employment as ConsiderationSupporting Other
Agreements
During the survey period, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held in Dixie Homecrafters, Inc. v.
Homecrafters of America, LLC 41 that under Georgia law, a forum
selection clause in a nondisclosure agreement is enforceable against atwill employees, even though the only consideration is continued
employment. 47 In Dixie Homecrafters, the plaintiff business organizations, citizens of Georgia, sued several business and individual defendants, alleging various torts and unlawful competition." Six of the
individual defendants were former employees in plaintiff's Pennsylvania
office, 49 and all six testified individually that they were not residents
of Georgia. ° Three of these defendants had signed a nondisclosure
agreement with the plaintiff.5 ' Paragraph 6.1 of that agreement
provided that
This Agreement and any disputes arising under or related thereto
(whether for breach of contract, tortious conduct, or otherwise) shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Georgia, without reference to its
conflict of law principles. Any legal actions, suits or proceedings arising
out of this Agreement (whether for breach of contract, tortious conduct,
or otherwise) shall be brought exclusively in the state or federal courts

43.

Id. at 62-63, 666 S.E.2d at 467.

44. Id. at 63,666 S.E.2d at 467 (quoting Woody's Steaks, LLC v. Pastoria, 261 Ga. App.
815, 818, 584 S.E.2d 41, 44 (2003)). In Avion Systems, "although the employment was
generally at-will, it was subject to [the employee's] agreement to refrain from terminating
her employment for [twelve] months." Id.
45. Id.
46. No. 1:08-CV-0649-JOF, 2009 WL 596009 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2009).
47. Id. at *6.
48. Id. at *1.

49. Id.
50. See id. at *1-3 (discussing the residence of each employee defendant and their
contacts with Georgia).
51. Id. at *4.
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of Georgia, and the parties to this Agreement hereby accept and submit
to the personal jurisdiction of these Georgia courts with respect to52any
legal actions, suits or proceedings arising out of this Agreement.
The defendants claimed that Georgia lacked personal jurisdiction over
them and argued that the nondisclosure agreement was invalid because
there was no additional consideration, which Pennsylvania law would
require.'
The district court applied Georgia's choice of law rule and
held that, unlike Pennsylvania law, Georgia law "permits the signing of
a non-disclosure or non-compete agreement for at-will employees with no
additional consideration other than continued employment.'M Accordingly, it found the nondisclosure agreement valid and concluded that the
defendants who signed the agreement had contractually consented to
Georgia's exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.'
IV.
A.

NEGLIGENT HIRING OR RETENTION

Overview

Under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20,6 "[t]he employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency.""v The Georgia Court of Appeals has held
that this statute imposes a duty on the employer to "warn other
employees of dangers incident to employment that 'the employer knows
or ought to know but which are unknown to the employee.'" 8 For an
employee to sustain an action for negligent hiring or retention, a
plaintiff must show that the employer employed an individual who "the
employer knew or should have known posed a risk of harm to others
where it [was] reasonably foreseeable from the employee's tendencies or
propensities that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *6. The court explained, "'[in a case founded on diversity jurisdiction, the

district court must apply the forum state's choice of law rules.'" Id. (quoting Federated
Rural Elec. Ins. Exch. v. R.D. Moody & Assocs., Inc., 468 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006)).
55. Id.
56. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2008).
57. Id.
58. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20).
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by the plaintiff."5 9 Typically, "the determination of whether an
employer used ordinary care in hiring an employee is a jury issue."6
Evidence of PriorSimilar Misconduct
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in
Ferman v. Bailey"1 that evidence of an employee's previous harassment
of other employees is relevant to a claim of negligent hiring and
retention because it tends to show that the employer should have known
that the employee posed a risk of committing similar harassment against
the plaintiff.6 2 In Ferman a female dental hygienist sued a male
dentist for numerous tort charges and sued the dental center where they
both worked for negligent hiring and retention of that dentist. The
dentist possessed a photograph of the hygienist in her bathing suit taken
in Mexico on an employer-sponsored trip. He posted the picture in her
workspace with the words "Ready in Mexico" written on it and told her
that he would have the photograph enlarged. He habitually called her
"R.I.M," which stood for "Ready in Mexico," in front of patients and other
employees.'
The dentist followed the hygienist around the workplace so frequently
that she asked other employees to accompany her to the supply room
and the restroom, but the dentist habitually sent those employees to the
front of the office. He told her that he wanted to play strip poker with
her, then gave her a deck of cards and told her to start practicing. The
following month, the dentist carried a bottle of vodka to the hygienist's
home so that, according to him, they could play strip poker and probably
have sex. At her home he grabbed her and pushed her body against his.
After she asked him to leave, the dentist threatened to kill her and
kissed her on the mouth.' The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
hygienist on the negligent hiring and retention claims.
At trial, the hygienist presented evidence that the dental center knew
the dentist had harassed other employees.' The dentist and the dental
center argued on appeal that the trial court should not have admitted
B.

59.

Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606

(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

60.

Tecumseh Prods. Co., 250 Ga. App. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912 (citing Sparlin

Chiropractic Clinic, P.C. v. TOPS Pers. Servs., Inc., 193 Ga. App. 181, 181-82, 387 S.E.2d
411, 412 (1989)).

61. 292 Ga. App. 288, 664 S.E.2d 285 (2008).
62.
63.

Id. at 290, 664 S.E.2d at 287.
Id. at 288-89, 664 S.E.2d at 286-87.

64. Id. at 289, 664 S.E.2d at 287.
65.

Id. at 288, 664 S.E.2d at 286.

66. See id. at 291, 664 S.E.2d at 288.
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such evidence because the witnesses did not testify to tortious conduct
against the plaintiff.67 The court of appeals held that such evidence
was admissible for the claim of negligent hiring and retention "because
it tended to show that the Dental Center should have known that [the
dentist] posed a risk of committing the same type of harassing behavior
against [the hygienist]."6
Unrelated Criminal History
During the survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held in CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Pyramid Stone
Industries, Inc. 69 that, under Georgia law, liability for negligent hiring
will not attach simply because an employee has a criminal history
unrelated to the misconduct at issue in the current litigation 70 unless
that criminal history made the misconduct foreseeable. 7' In CSX the
defendant's employee drove a front-end loader over railroad tracks,
causing the tracks such damage that the plaintiff's train derailed. The
defendant knew its employee had a criminal record. 72 The railroad
argued that the employee's criminal record demonstrated "dangerous
propensities to disobey rules, take things that do not belong to him, and
trespass onto other people's property and damage their property" and,
therefore, "a reasonable jury could find that [the defendant] breached its
duty of ordinary care in hiring, retaining, training and supervising [the
employee]."73
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and noted that under the plaintiff's
reasoning, "it would be negligent for any employer whose work includes
dangerous machinery to hire an employee who has a history of violence
or irresponsibility."74 Moreover, the court pointed out that the employee was well qualified for the job because of his prior experience with
criminal conduct
dangerous heavy machinery, and "none of his past 75
occurred during his prior work with such equipment."
The court also noted that, under Georgia law, the causation element
in the torts of negligent hiring and retention require that it be "reasonC.

67. Id. at 290, 664 S.E.2d at 287.
68. Id.
69. 293 F. App'x 754 (11th Cir. 2008).
70. Id. at 756.
71. See i.
72. Id. at 755. The court did not discuss the specific nature of the employee's criminal
history other than that it involved the employee's "irresponsibility for others' property."
Id. at 756.
73. Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 756.
75. Id.
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ably foreseeable from the employee's tendencies or propensities that the
employee could cause the type of harm sustained by the plaintiff."76 To
satisfy this test, the "'victim's injuries should have been foreseen as the
natural and probable consequence of hiring [or retaining] the employee.'" The court held that the employee's criminal history would not
make it natural and probable that he would trespass on the plaintiff's
property using the defendant's equipment.7 8
V. REsTRicTIvE COVENANTS
A.

Noncompete Agreements

1. Overview. Agreements that place general restraints on trade are
void as against public policy.79 Generally, noncompete agreements are
disfavored in contractual relations because they place restrictions on
trade, thereby reducing competition.' Nonetheless, courts will uphold
a noncompete agreement when the agreement merely places a partial
restraint upon trade. 1 In general, a noncompete agreement is valid as
a partial restraint on trade when the agreement is specific and is
reasonable in regard to duration, territorial coverage, and the scope of
activities prohibited. 2
Whether the terms of the noncompete agreement are reasonable is a
question of law for the court to decide.' A questionable restriction, if
not void on its face, may require the introduction of additional facts to
determine whether it is reasonable.' However, depending on the type
of contract, the court will apply different levels of scrutiny to determine
the reasonableness of the contract." If the noncompete agreement is
ancillary to an employment agreement, a stricter standard is applied;'
and if any provision of that agreement is considered overbroad or

76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Munroe, 277 Ga. at 863, 596 S.E.2d
at 606).
77. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga.
App. 456, 459, 590 S.E.2d 807, 813 (2003)).

78. Id.
79. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 2009).
80. See JAMES W. WIMBERLY JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAW

81. See id.
82. See W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn Div. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga.

§ 2:11 (4th ed. 2008).

464, 465, 422 S.E.2d 529,
531 (1992). See generally WIMBERLY, supra note 80, § 2:11.
83. Mouyal, 262 Ga. at 465, 422 S.E.2d at 531.
84. Koger Props., Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 69, 274 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1981).
85. See WIMBERLY, supra note 80, § 2:11.
86. See id.
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unreasonable, the entire agreement is invalid. 7 But if the agreement is
pursuant to a contract for the sale of a business, a less stringent
standard allows for broader provisions; even if provisions of that
agreement are deemed overbroad or unreasonable, the court may "blue
pencil" to rewrite or sever the overly broad provisions." However, "in
restrictive covenant cases strictly scrutinized as employment contracts,
Georgia does not employ the 'blue pencil' doctrine of severability." 9
2. Franchise Agreements. Shortly after this year's survey period
ended, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Court of
Appeals decision in Atlanta Bread Co. Internationalv. Lupton-Smith.90
The court held that a covenant not to compete in a franchise agreement,
to be enforceable, must contain definite territorial limitations and specify
the restricted activities with sufficient particularity.9
In Atlanta
Bread, the plaintiff owned several franchises of the Atlanta Bread
Company and his franchise agreement contained the following restrictive
covenant:
During the term of this Agreement, neither Franchisee nor any
Principal Shareholder, for so long as such Principal Shareholder owns
an Interest in Franchisee, may, without prior written consent of
Franchisor, directly or indirectly engage in, or acquire any financial or
beneficial interest in (including any interest in corporations, partnerships, trusts, unincorporated associations or joint ventures), advise,
help, guarantee loans or make loans to, any bakery/deli business whose
method of operation is similar to that employed by store units within

the System. 9'

While the plaintiff owned these franchises, Atlanta Bread learned that
the plaintiff had entered a franchise agreement with PJ's Coffee, a
competing business, and Atlanta Bread terminated the plaintiff's
franchise agreement on the ground that his new PJs Coffee franchise
constituted a material breach of the above-quoted covenant.93
The court held that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable because
it lacked a territorial limitation. 94 The court noted that in a franchise

87. See id. But see supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
88. See WIMBERLY, supra note 80, § 2:11 n.35.
89. Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Roadtrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320, 551
S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001). But see supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
90. 285 Ga. 587, 679 S.E.2d 722 (2009).
91. Id. at 591, 679 S.E.2d at 725.
92. Id. at 588, 679 S.E.2d at 723 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id., 679 S.E.2d at 724.
94. Id. at 591, 679 S.E.2d at 725.
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agreement, if any part of a restrictive covenant is unreasonable, the
entire agreement is unenforceable.95 In response to Atlanta Bread's
contention that the usual rules regarding employment-context restrictive
covenants should not apply to franchise agreements, the court held that
a covenant not to compete in a franchise agreement should "receiv[e] the
same treatment as noncompetition covenants found in employment
contracts." 6 The same measure of reasonableness applies to both
contracts.97
During the survey period, the
v.
Prime Pediatrics,PC." that
Azzouz
held
in
of
Appeals
Georgia Court
a provision in a covenant, which prohibited a pediatrician from using a
broad variety of advertising venues within a five-county region for two
In Azzouz a pediatrician's
years, was not unreasonably broad.9
employment contract contained a covenant prohibiting him from
practicing pediatric medicine in a five-county area for two years if his
employment should terminate. After this pediatrician informed his
employer of his intent to leave and start his own practice in the
prohibited area, the employer obtained an interlocutory injunction, from
which the pediatrician appealed.1" The appellant's primary claim on
appeal was that the language in the restrictive covenant was ambiguous
and thus overbroad.1 'O The restrictive covenant provided, among other
things, that

3. Scope of Prohibited Activities.

[n]othing contained herein however shall be construed so as to prohibit
the Employee from practicing medicine as a pediatrician outside the
territory set forth above before the expiration of said two (2) years, or
within the territory as described above after the expiration of two (2)
years, nor from prohibiting the Employee from practicing specifically
any specialty of medicine other than pediatrics."8
The agreement prohibited
advertising in any form, including but not limited to, telephone, white
and yellow pages, radio, newspaper advertisements, signage advertising, keeping or maintaining an office within the prohibited geographical area, posting web-sites showing business locations in the prohibited

95. Id.
96. Id. at 589, 679 S.E.2d at 724.
97. Id.
98. 296 Ga. App. 602, 675 S.E.2d 314 (2009).

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 607, 675 S.E.2d at 319.
Id. at 602, 675 S.E.2d at 316.
Id. at 603, 675 S.E.2d at 317.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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geographical area, or mailings to patients of Employer within the
prohibited geographical area." 3
The appellant argued that the covenant could "be read to mean either
(1) the defendant is only barred from working as a pediatrician and
advertising his services within the five-county area, or (2) the defendant
is also barred from working in any hospital that advertises within the
five-county area." "' The court disagreed and held that in light of the
clause reading "[niothing contained herein however shall be construed
so as to prohibit the Employee from practicing medicine as a pediatrician
outside the territory," the agreement was unambiguous."w
The court then considered whether this unambiguous agreement was
reasonable.'" It held that
[w]ith regard to the restriction on mailings to all of [the employer's]
patients, there is an interplay between the scope of the prohibited
behavior and the territorial restriction: "if the scope of prohibited
behavior is narrow enough (e.g., contacting those with whom the
employee dealt while working for the employer), the covenant may be
reasonable even if it has no territorial limitation or has a territorial
limitation which is very broad. But if the scope of the prohibition is
broader, the territorial limitation must be specified and closely tied to
the area in which the employee actually worked."'"
The trial court concluded that the appellant intended to continue
practicing in all five of the prohibited counties and had practiced in all
five on behalf of his employer.0
Accordingly, the court of appeals held
that the restrictive covenant was reasonable." 9 Also relevant in the
court's analysis was a factually similar case, Raiford v. Kramer,"° in
which the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a covenant that (1) had a
duration of two years, (2) "applied to [a] five-county [region] where the
employer's practice was located and from which it drew patients," and
(3) was limited to a particular medical specialty."'

103. Id. at 604, 675 S.E.2d at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 604-05, 675 S.E.2d at 318 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106. Id. at 606, 675 S.E.2d at 319-20.
107. Id., 675 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting Chaichimansour v. Pets are People Too, No. 2, Inc.,
226 Ga. App. 69, 71, 485 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1997)).
108. Id. at 607, 675 S.E.2d at 319.
109. Id.
110. 231 Ga. 757, 204 S.E.2d 171 (1974).
111. Azzouz, 296 Ga. App. at 607,675 S.E.2d at 319 (citingRaiford,231 Ga. at 758, 204
S.E.2d at 172).
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4. Specification with Particularity. During the survey period,
the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Avion Systems, Inc. v. Thompson," 2 discussed above, 1 3 that a covenant prohibiting an employee "from
dealing with a client for any pecuniary gain, regardless of whether her
activities were related to [the employer's] business [was] overbroad and
unenforceable, as it [was] not reasonably necessary to protect the
interests of [the employer]." 1 4 To determine the reasonableness of the
covenant, the court endorsed a "three-element test of duration, territorial
coverage, and scope of activity."15 Regarding the third element of this
test, the court noted that a covenant that "does not specify with
particularity the nature of the business activities in which the employee
is forbidden to engage is generally considered unreasonable.""' The
court held that the provision against dealing with a client for "any
pecuniary gain" did not specify the prohibited activities and was thus
unreasonable." 7
Also during the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in
Global Link Logistics, Inc. v. Briles1. that "[a]lthough facts may be
necessary 'to show that a questionable restriction, though not void on its
face, is, in fact, reasonable,' a covenant containing sufficiently indefinite
restrictions '[can]not be saved by additional facts' and is 'void on its
face.'""' 9 In Global Link Logistics, the plaintiff, who left an executive

position at the defendant firm and began work for a competitor, sought
injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the restrictive covenants in
his employment agreement. 2 ° The noncompete covenant barred the
plaintiff from "engag[ing] (whether as an owner, operator, manager,
employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, representative or
otherwise), directly or indirectly, in any Competitive Business" and also
barred solicitation of all customers and employees.' 2' The agreement
also contained an arbitration clause, providing that "arbitration ... shall
be the sole and exclusive method for resolving any claim or dispute...

112.

293 Ga. App. 60, 666 S.E.2d 464 (2008).

113. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
114. 293 Ga. App. at 64, 666 S.E.2d at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 296 Ga. App. 175, 674 S.E.2d 52 (2009).
119. Id. at 177, 674 S.E.2d at 54 (second alteration in original) (quoting Koger Props.,
Inc., 247 Ga. at 69, 274 S.E.2d at 331).
120. Id. at 175, 674 S.E.2d at 53.
121. Id. at 178, 674 S.E.2d at 55 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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arising out of or relating to the rights and obligations of the parties

under this Agreement."'2 2
The trial court held the covenants unenforceable and denied the
defendant's motion to compel arbitration regarding the covenants. The
defendant appealed, contending that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding the covenants unenforceable and in refusing to submit the
entire matter to arbitration."2
The court of appeals noted that
"'[whether [a] restraint imposed by [an] employment contract is
reasonable is a question of law for determination by the court, which
considers the nature and extent of the trade or business, the situation
of the parties, and all the other circumstances.'"' 2' The court of
appeals thus reviewed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel
arbitration in terms of its correctness as a matter of law."2 Under
Georgia law, "'[a] non-competition covenant which prohibits an employee
from working for a competitor in any capacity, that is, a covenant which
fails to specify with particularity the activities which the employee is
prohibited from performing, is too broad and indefinite to be enforceable.'"' 26 Thus, the court held the covenant unenforceable.' 2 7 Because the plaintiff did not hold any interest in the defendant company,
the lesser scrutiny afforded to covenants ancillary to the sale of a
business did not apply in this case; therefore, the covenants could not be
judicially modified to make them acceptable.'2 8
B.

NondisclosureAgreements
The court of appeals also held in Global Link Logistics that a
nondisclosure clause was overbroad and unenforceable".9 because the
clause had no time limitation and prohibited the defendant from
disclosing or using for his own purposes "the information (including lists
of customers or potential customers), observations, customer and vendor
relationships and data (including trade secrets) obtained by him while
employed by the Company." "'

122. Id. at 176, 674 S.E.2d at 54 (alterations in original).
123. Id. at 175, 675 S.E.2d at 53.
124. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett, 231
Ga. App. 289, 292, 498 S.E.2d 346, 350 (1998)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 178, 675 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting Natl Teen-Ager Co. v. Scarborough, 254 Ga.
467, 469, 330 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1985)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 177, 675 S.E.2d at 55.
129. Id. at 177-78, 674 S.E.2d at 55.
130. Id. at 175, 674 S.E.2d at 53-54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Also during the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in

Atlanta Bread Co. International,Inc. v. Lupton-Smith 131 that a nondisclosure restriction in a franchise agreement-which forbade the
franchisee from appropriating or disclosing the franchisor's trade
secrets-was reasonable insofar as it pertained to information meeting
the statutory definition of a trade secret.'32 The nondisclosure clause
provided:
Neither Franchisee nor any Shareholder shall at any time (i) appropriate or use the trade secrets incorporated in the System, or any portion
thereof, in any business which is not within the System, (ii) disclose or
reveal any portion of the System to any person, other than to Franchi(iv)
see's Store employees as an incident of their training ....
communicate, divulge or use for the benefit of any other person or
entity any confidential information, knowledge or know-how concerning
the methods of development or operation of a store utilizing the
System, which may be communicated by Franchisor in connection with
the franchise granted hereunder."
The court noted that under Georgia law, a "nondisclosure clause with no
time limitation, as here, is unenforceable as to information that is not
a trade secret."3 4 Therefore, it held that this nondisclosure clause was
only enforceable with regard to trade secrets as defined by O.C.G.A.
§ 10-1-761(4)."3 The court also held that the issue of whether a party

131. 292 Ga. App. 14, 663 S.E.2d 743 (2008), affd, 285 Ga. 587,679 S.E.2d 722 (2009).
The supreme court did not address the nondisclosure restriction. For a discussion of the
supreme court opinion, see supra text accompanying notes 90-97.

132. 292 Ga. App. at 20, 663 S.E.2d at 748.
133. Id. at 16, 663 S.E.2d at 745-46 (ellipses in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
134. Id. at 20, 663 S.E.2d at 748.
135. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4) (2009); Atlanta Bread Co., 292 Ga. App. at 20, 663 S.E.2d
at 748. The statute provides as follows:

"Trade secret" means information, without regard to form, including, but not
limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a compilation, a
program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a process, financial data,
financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual or potential customers or
suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which

information:
(A)Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can

obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to

maintain its secrecy.
O.C.G.A_ § 10-1-761(4).
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has disclosed
a trade secret is a question of fact for the jury to deter13 6
mine.

C. NonsolicitationAgreements
The court of appeals held in Global Link Logistics, discussed
above,"'7 that a nonsolicitation agreement barring an employee from
soliciting any of the employer's customers, present or future suppliers,
or employees for twenty-four months' 38 was unenforceable.' 9 However, because this nonsolicitation was discussed only in conjunction with
the same contract's unenforceable noncompete agreement, 40 and
because under Georgia law the unenforceability of one part of a
restrictive covenant will render the entire covenant unenforceable,'
it does not appear that the nonsolicitation agreement at issue was
essential to the judgment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although labor and employment issues derived from Georgia law often
are not as complex as their federal counterparts, the issues arising
under state law are becoming more challenging with each passing year.
Adding to this challenge is the growing overlap between state and
federal issues. Regardless of whether a practitioner professes to
specialize in state, federal, administrative, or trial law, it is important
to recognize that any one law or legal proceeding can and does impact
other relations between employer and employee.

136. Atlanta Bread Co., 292 Ga. App. at 21, 663 S.E.2d at 749.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 118-30.
138. 296 Ga. App. at 175-76, 674 S.E.2d at 54.
139. Id. at 178, 674 S.E.2d at 55.
140. See id. ("The noncompete covenant at issue here bars [the employee] from
'engagling] (whether as an owner, operator, manager, employee, officer, director,
consultant, advisor, representative or otherwise),directly or indirectly, in any Competitive
Business,' and also bars solicitation of all [the employer's] customers as well as employees.
As such, it is unenforceable." (second alteration in original)).
141. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Great S. Equip. Sales, LLC, 289 Ga. App. 474, 478, 657 S.E.2d
581,584 (2008) ("Because the nonsolicitation clause was unenforceable, the noncompetition
clause included in the agreement was likewise unenforceable.").

